Benjamin Lee Whorf

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What comparative linguistics shows is that the grammatical constructions of Western-Indo-European languages, which are similar to each other, are fundamentally different from some non-Western grammars.

Before the advent of comparative linguistics, Western thinkers assumed that the use of language merely followed rational and intelligent thinking. Thought was supposed to depend on laws of logic or reason, and in turn these laws were supposed to be the same for everyone, no matter what language was used. Whorf points out that this view of language was universal in the West because no one knew of any exceptions to it. If a rule has no exceptions then it cannot be seen to be a rule ; it melts into the background of experience and we usually remain unconscious of it. Only when a contradiction appears do we understand what we have previously taken for granted.

European languages analyse reality into two sections: there are ‘things’ (that is, nouns) and there are their attributes, or what they are or what they do. Essentially there is a subject (the noun) plus the predicate (that which expresses something about the subject). So European languages are classified as ‘subject-predicate’ languages.

One language that illustrates a marked difference from Western languages is Hopi. In Whorf ’s view, the Hopi language dispenses with the subject - predicate orientation, and analyses reality mainly in terms of events. The evolutionary significance of this difference is profound. If somethings, such as nouns, are not important to a person, then they are not likely to feature prominently in that person’s understanding of the world.

For example, some languages have very few words for the wide range of colours. If a language has only four colour words in its vocabulary, then the language member can still separate a wide range of coloured objects into separate categories of colour ; yet these separate categories that exceed his four standard ones will not be important to him.

Western languages, with their subject - predicate division, can be thought of as being orientated to patterns. Whereas languages like Hopi are process orientated. The most significant difference between these two orientations is over the issue of identity.

Nouns (and hence names) give an identity.

The consequences of this relation are great. The lack of emphasis in Hopi on a subject produces a sense of passivity in the Indians – personal identity is not important. Hence they see no need to evolve beyond the communal group. In my view, Western individualism could not have arisen if a subject - predicate language had been lacking.

There are Two Aspects to Thought

The forms of thinking are controlled by laws of grammar, which are laws of pattern.

Side by side goes the reference function, the giving of names to objects.

Whorf considered that the name-giving aspect (which produces the segmentation of nature into objects or signs) is an aspect of grammar. I disagree with him. To give a name means to produce a sign, and this, in Western languages, is primary to grammar. However, I accept his view that grammar originates the flow of events.

Whorf reversed the Western view on logic. Instead of language following the rules of logic, he showed that Western logic only conforms to the necessities of Western grammar. Languages like Hopi have the potential to form systems of logic that would be very different from Western ones.

Moral Influences

I give an example of the manner in which grammar controls the way that reality is viewed. I take two closely-related languages, English and French, and indicate that even moral values depend on grammar.

Where a separation of two ideas is clearly made, then we can expect that this division is of importance. Where the division is not so clearly made, so that more wordy descriptions or more contextual explanations have to be used, then we can expect that the division is of less importance. This claim may seem obvious enough, but becomes less so when we apply it to concepts that contain moral values.

The English words ‘wife’ and ‘woman’ are rendered in French by one word ‘femme’. To separate ‘wife’ from ‘woman’ in French requires either qualifying phrases or the need to understand the context in which ‘femme’ is used. It is harder to establish the difference in French than it is in English. This difference between the two languages can be taken to indicate the relative importance, or lack of it, of distinguishing a woman from a wife. On the basis of this difference we should expect that a Frenchman has a more casual attitude to women in general than an Englishman has. The difference in grammatical construction leads to an expectation that there will be differences in sexual attitudes, with an ‘average’ Englishman valuing sexual propriety and rectitude more highly than an ‘average’ Frenchman. And this appears to be the case.

This example has, however, lost much of its current applicability because of the power of the media: casualness in sexual mores is now propagated as a norm. The boundaries of thinking are always altered by learning processes, irrespective of whether what is learned is good or bad.

In Whorf ’s view the grammatical aspect of language overrides and controls the reference or name-giving aspect. My view is slightly different.
The function of grammar is to indicate relationships whereas the reference function indicates identity.

In the evolution of mankind, whichever function is highlighted depends on the needs of any community. In the Eastern world and in native societies the focus of development is on the way that life is lived, in all its relationships ; hence domination of language by grammar is likely to be the rule. By contrast, in the Western world the focus of development is on achieving an understanding of the working mechanisms of reality, whence the dominance of language by signs is necessary. Perhaps the future need is to try to harmonise both approaches to reality.

Linguistic Magic

In Ogden and Richards’ book ‘The Meaning of Meaning’ they discuss name magic in chapter II. In the ancient world, words often had mysterious meaning. To know the name of an object was to have power over that object. Names and words were part of things. Names had occult power. To safeguard this power these names were sacred or secret, known only to initiates. Even in daily life, primitive peoples showed great dislike to their names being mentioned by strangers, presumably because the speaker could control people through knowing their names.

This use of names as an avenue to power can be considered to be an occult mode of philosophical Idealism. Here it is the signifier that is being used to manipulate the signified. The novelty of George Berkeley is that he switched the focus of Idealism to the signified, that is, he switched the focus of his thinking from the name to the idea. Idealism now became philosophical. He did this just as science was becoming the modern form of name magic, though in this case the name is now a chemical formula. Science became a social form of occult power. With formulae science controls the material world.

We now take the scientific outlook as the natural one because we no longer understand the occult view of life. On its own terms, name magic was just as valid a way of experiencing reality as is the modern orientation to science. They are parallel views which, however, respond to different regions of the mind.

The Intellectual Two-Step

Perhaps a major philosophy originates from one central question. My central question is: what is the basis of my fear ? I have had to sojourn in the realms of psychology in order to discover answers. The answers to my quest have shaped my philosophy.

The Cartesian question is: what can I know in consciousness ? For philosophical Idealism the question is: what is the meaning of perception ? Now consciousness leads to perception. Consciousness is always prior to perception and to language. Therefore the Cartesian question is antecedent to the Idealist one.

These questions can be reformulated. The Cartesian question becomes: how do I know anything ? The Idealist question becomes : why do I know anything ? In other words, the Cartesian versus Idealist debate is just a variation on the old riddle of ‘how’ versus ‘why’.

There are two primary sign systems: consciousness and language. There are two primary philosophical traditions: Cartesianism and Idealism. Which sign goes with which tradition ? Saussure’s sign is arbitrary, and so it is Idealist. The sign of consciousness is not completely arbitrary, because of the dialectical component. Neither is Cartesianism arbitrary, since it incorporates empiricism ; empiricism is the way to resolve Descartes’ doubt. Therefore:

Cartesianism centres on the sign of consciousness.

Idealism centres on the sign of language.

What I have been doing in my quest is subjecting a core position of Idealism to a Cartesian critique.

Books

Whorf, Benjamin Lee. In John Carroll (ed.) Language, Thought and Reality. MIT Press, 1956 and 1995.

Ogden, C, and Richards, I . The Meaning of Meaning.

The articles in this section are :

Semiology

Existentialism and Psychology

Meaning and Value

Structuralism

Structure and Ideology

Benjamin Lee Whorf

Copyright © 2003 Ian Heath
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